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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

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 Thursday 16 February 1978      CG NIDC 78/039C
 

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DIA review(s) completed.

State Dept. review completed

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 16 February 1978

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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**RHODESIA: Eight-Point Agreement**

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[redacted] //Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and black nationalist leaders inside Rhodesia yesterday signed an eight-point agreement on principles for black majority rule in Rhodesia. The agreement culminates almost two months of sometimes acrimonious bargaining during which Smith sought political and economic safeguards for Rhodesia's 265,000 whites in exchange for black majority rule on the basis of one-man, one-vote--a change he once vowed would not occur in "a thousand years." If the agreement results in a viable alternative to the Anglo-American proposals, it will force the externally based nationalists and the frontline presidents to reexamine their options.//

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[redacted] //Smith and the internal nationalist leaders-- Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau--still face a number of potentially difficult tasks, such as delimiting constituencies, preparing for national elections, defining the structure of Rhodesia's security forces under majority rule, and winning international acceptance for what they have done. As their first task, they must sell their agreement to their own constituencies--Smith through a parliamentary vote of approval and the nationalists through some kind of black referendum.//

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[redacted] //Although the terms of the agreement were not released, it apparently provides for a 100-member parliament in which whites will be guaranteed 28 seats for a period of 10 years or two parliaments, whichever is longer. Of those 28 seats, 20 will be elected by white voters while the remainder will be elected by a common roll of black and white voters.//

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[redacted] //According to a government spokesman, a council made up of Smith and the three black leaders will preside over the transition period, which will probably extend into the fall. When the negotiations opened in December, the leaders envisioned national elections in June or July with black majority rule coming in September.//

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[redacted] //For Smith, an internal settlement is the lesser of two evils. He rejected the Anglo-American plan on the grounds that it allowed too large a role in the transition period for the guerrilla-backed Patriotic Front alliance of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and vested too much authority in the British-appointed resident commissioner.//

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[REDACTED] //If Rhodesia's whites and blacks approve the agreement, Smith will be in a position to present world opinion with a potentially viable alternative to the Anglo-American plan. Neither he nor the nationalists expect immediate international or African acceptance. Rather, they believe acceptance will come over an extended period of time as a transfer of power to black majority rule moves closer.//

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[REDACTED] //Initially, Smith probably will try to use his settlement to persuade the UK and the US to abandon their proposals, although his prospects for that are not good. The internal settlement in any event will not insulate Rhodesia from the growing military and economic pressures on it. The fighting will continue, probably at a gradually escalating pace as the Patriotic Front attempts to disrupt the transition process. That, in turn, will increase the strains on an economy already stretched very thin by the conflict.//

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[REDACTED] //Thus, over the longer term, Smith may be obliged to resume full-scale negotiations with his opponents in an effort to reconcile the two competing settlement plans. In accepting such negotiations, however, he would probably ask for a temporary cease-fire and major concessions regarding the role of the Patriotic Front during a transition period. In the meantime, in order to keep the pressure on he will proceed with implementation of his own settlement, hoping that a recently announced amnesty will reduce the guerrilla threat and that Nkomo will return to Rhodesia.//

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[REDACTED] //Much of Smith's success in implementing an internal settlement depends on the actions of Patriotic Front co-leaders Nkomo and Mugabe and of the frontline presidents. They already have been unnerved over the prospect of Smith reaching agreement with the internal nationalists.//

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[REDACTED] //The heaviest strain is likely to be felt by Nkomo and Mugabe. Neither fully trusts the other, despite their public professions of unity. Although Smith adamantly opposes any role for Mugabe, he wants Nkomo to participate in the transition period or at least run in national elections. Both Smith and the Rhodesian-based nationalists realize that Nkomo's participation would boost the credibility of their settlement. Smith will use longstanding unofficial contacts with Nkomo and Zambian President Kaunda, Nkomo's chief backer, to induce him to return to Rhodesia.//

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[redacted] //As a group, the frontline presidents will quickly condemn the internal settlement and will press the UK and the US to take an unequivocal stand against it. On the military front, they may support increased guerrilla operations into Rhodesia. That option, however, demands a degree of cooperation between Nkomo's and Mugabe's guerrillas that has been lacking to date. It also carries with it the unappealing prospect of increased foreign involvement--Soviet, Cuban, and South African. Heavy fighting, moreover, could lead to a massive exodus of whites and serious economic dislocation, which the frontline presidents do not want.//

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[redacted] //The presidents will have to consider the prospect that an internal settlement eventually will attract some support from moderate black African states. This could spark a debate in the UN or the Organization of African Unity that could divide Africa, as the issue of Angola did in 1975 and 1976.//

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[redacted] //If the internal settlement begins to gain momentum, the presidents, as well as Nkomo and Mugabe, will have to review their options. Nyerere would try to hold the frontline presidents together in rejecting the internal settlement, but he would have to overcome serious reservations on the part of the others.//

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[redacted] //Kaunda, for example, is reluctant to allow the launching of large-scale military operations into Rhodesia from Zambian territory, where Nkomo's faction of the Patriotic Front is based. Such operations would bring heavy retaliation by the Rhodesians, which might involve the poorly equipped Zambian armed forces.//

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[redacted] //Kaunda already is under heavy pressure from his party to abandon his preoccupation with the Rhodesian problem and to turn his attention to serious domestic problems. He would face strong domestic resistance to any escalation of the war, especially against a black-led government.//

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[redacted] //Machel, for his part, appears ready to accept continued losses from Rhodesian raids into Mozambique, but only as long as the Patriotic Front maintains a semblance of unity and shows a willingness to negotiate on the Anglo-American plan in good faith. He could not back continued armed struggle by Mugabe's Mozambique-based faction alone unless this had the support of the other frontline presidents. [redacted]


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#### USSR-EGYPT: Establishing a Dialogue

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
[redacted] The Soviets are testing Egyptian willingness to establish a "constructive dialogue" between the two countries. [redacted]



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[redacted] Some improvement in relations with Egypt is certainly desired by the Soviets. They continue to view that country as the most important Arab state politically and are anxious to end their exclusion from Middle East peace negotiations. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Egyptians may still want to preserve the Soviet option. Sadat does not want a role for the USSR in Middle East negotiations at this time, but he probably accepts the fact that ultimately Moscow will be reintroduced into the process in some larger forum. In fact, Sadat and top Foreign Ministry officials have again begun in recent weeks to describe the Cairo and Jerusalem talks between Egypt and Israel as preparatory to a Geneva conference. [redacted]

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[redacted] The communique issued after Sadat's recent visit to Romania said that participation of all interested parties in the Cairo political talks--or in meetings proposed by UN Secretary General Waldheim--would be useful preparation for a Geneva conference. The Romanians apparently pushed for the reintroduction of the USSR into the process.

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
[redacted] Reference to Waldheim's proposal suggests that Sadat sees a possible need to extend the time frame of negotiations. The meetings proposed by Waldheim offer a possible forum for Syria, which has refused to take part in any negotiations arising from the Egyptian-Israeli talks, and for the USSR, which has strongly condemned them.

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[redacted] The Soviets have tried on various occasions in recent years to restore more cordial relations with the Egyptians. Shevchenko made a similar effort last year, but the current contact is the first since Sadat's peace initiative last November and the subsequent closing of the Soviet cultural centers and consulates in Egypt. Recent reporting has indicated a Soviet readiness to respond to an Egyptian gesture, and the Soviets have tried to avoid further exacerbating relations. [redacted]

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


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#### ISRAEL: Rightwingers to Protest

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Right-wing Israeli activists, who oppose Prime Minister Begin's peace proposals, are planning to challenge the government's West Bank settlements policy on Sunday. Rabbi Meir Kahane, a leader of the Jewish Defense League, has announced that his group and some Gush Emunim followers will attempt to take over a former hospital in the old Jewish quarter of the West Bank town of Hebron.

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Kahane hopes to embarrass Begin, whom he has invited to attend the ceremony, and to undermine the Israeli cabinet's current efforts to exercise restraint in establishing new settlements on the West Bank. Kahane and Gush leaders made a similar attempt to convert the former hospital into a synagogue in the summer of 1976 but were forcibly removed by then - Prime Minister Rabin's government.



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[redacted] By advertising his intentions, which are openly at odds with government policy, Kahane probably has made it easy for Begin to head him off and assert the cabinet's authority on this matter. Kahane's provocative action could trigger Arab unrest in Hebron and damage Begin's credibility if the government fails to take prompt action to restrain the group. There have been several Arab demonstrations on the West Bank this month, apparently in reaction to Israeli settlement activity there. [redacted]

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## KENYA: Egyptian Plane Forced Down

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[redacted] //Kenya yesterday forced down an Egyptian civilian aircraft carrying ammunition to Somalia. The Kenyans took the action in spite of the possible diplomatic consequences because of their overriding fear of a Somali military threat and their uncompromising attitude toward anything they see as aiding Somali aggression.

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[redacted] //According to the Kenyan Government, it felt compelled to act when Egyptian planes early this week flew over the country even though Kenya had denied Egypt's overflight request. Kenya's subsequent protest to the Egyptian Ambassador has been ignored. Kenyan defense officials report that the aircraft, which is being kept at the Nairobi airport, contained munitions and that the crew has been detained. The Egyptians have asked the US and the UK to use their good offices with the Kenyans.//

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[redacted] //Kenya, which sees itself isolated by hostile neighbors, has sought to remain on good terms with Egypt and other moderate Arab states. It wants these countries to appreciate its security concerns and hopes it can induce them to press Somalia into renouncing its territorial claims against Kenya.//

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[redacted] //Kenyan fear of a Somali military threat, however, seems to override all other considerations. Even Somalia's declining military fortunes in the Ogaden have not eased Kenya's concern. The Kenyans probably believe that the

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setbacks suffered by the Somalis in Ethiopia have increased the chances that they will move against Kenya to save face. [redacted]

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#### CHAD: Situation Report

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[redacted] //Two of the three remaining government garrisons in northern Chad have apparently been either lost to the Libyan-supported Muslim rebels or abandoned in the last few days. French defense planners in Paris are pessimistic about the situation, and an official in the Foreign Ministry has privately confirmed that a French commando unit is in Chad.//

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[redacted] //Spokesmen for the rebels said in Paris yesterday that the government outpost at Fada surrendered Tuesday night. According to the US Embassy in Ndjamena, the garrison was discussing terms of surrender with the rebels earlier that day.//

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[redacted] The Embassy also reports that the government has ordered its troops to evacuate Ounianga-Kebir and retreat to Oum Chalouba--a distance of 300 kilometers over rebel-dominated desert terrain.

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[redacted] //The garrison at Faya-Largeau, the last major government outpost in the north, is still holding out. The situation at the garrison is relatively quiet for the moment, but the government force there is isolated and has little chance of being relieved.//

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[redacted] // [redacted] in Paris, French defense planners expect control of northern Chad to pass to the rebels within the next week or two as the defenders' ammunition runs out. [redacted] military officials in Paris see no way to reverse this trend, have a low opinion of the Chadian Government's military capabilities, and do not intend to get any more involved if they can help it.//

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
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
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**COLOMBIA: Congressional Elections**

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The congressional election in Colombia on 26 February will serve as a presidential primary for the badly splintered Liberal Party of President Lopez. The presidential election will be held in June. The Liberals are expected to carry their

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[redacted]  
customary legislative majority into the next congress, and the Liberal faction that fares best in the congressional election can be expected to provide the party's presidential candidate. The opposition Conservatives are counting on the Liberals' remaining destructively divided.

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[redacted] Presidential and congressional elections were originally to be held simultaneously this spring. Liberal Party officials have been concerned, however, that the party's numerous factions would not be able to unite behind one of the party's two leading presidential pre-candidates--Julio Cesar Turbay and former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. In December, the Liberals succeeded in passing controversial legislation separating the congressional and presidential elections. This maneuver bought the Liberals additional time to patch up political differences.

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[redacted] In a further attempt to strengthen the party against the attractive Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur, President Lopez engineered the San Carlos consensus--an agreement calling for the Liberal Party presidential nomination to go to the contender whose supporters win the most votes in the congressional elections.

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[redacted] This approach favors Turbay, a facile politician who controls much of the Liberal political machinery. Lleras, however, is an experienced statesman noted for economic reforms and strong fiscal policies--persuasive credentials in the eyes of a populace weary of inflation. Over the past several months, Lleras has narrowed Turbay's lead, but probably not enough to garner the nomination. A poor turnout at the polls, which is expected in view of low voter registration, probably will not hurt Turbay's grass-roots machine, but it will be a serious blow to Lleras, who is banking on last-minute support from undecided voters.

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[redacted] There is still a question, however, whether Lleras would honor the San Carlos accord and support Turbay, a long-time bitter enemy. Lleras probably would not run for the presidency on a maverick ticket because he realizes that would virtually assure the election of Betancur.

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[redacted] The election campaign has diverted public attention from the serious crime problem that was an issue late last year.

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The president's measures to counter kidnapings and other criminal activities have also assuaged the concern of the military.



BRIEF


Japan-China

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[redacted] Japan and China signed a long-term trade agreement early today, following five years of negotiations. The accord calls for an exchange of Chinese oil and coal for Japanese whole plants, industrial goods, and technology. The eight-year pact, totaling about \$20 billion, will further underscore Japan's position as China's leading supplier of capital goods.



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